1. The property that a woman brings to her husband's [resources] - be it landed property, movable property or servants - is not referred to with the term ketubah, but rather with the term nedunyah.

[More particularly, there are two subdivisions within this category.] When the husband accepts responsibility for the nedunyah and it is considered to be his property¹I.e., the article or land that the woman brings to the household is evaluated, and the husband takes responsibility for the value of the article. From this time onward, it is as if the article were his, and he is obligated to pay his wife a fixed amount if he divorces her or she is widowed. - i.e., if it decreases in value he suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is his - the property is referred to as nichsei tzon barzel.²This term literally means "property [that is like] iron sheep." The term iron is used to indicate that the husband's obligation is unchanging, like iron. The reference to sheep stems from the fact that during the Talmudic period in Eretz Yisrael, a similar agreement was frequently made with a shepherd with regard to the sheep entrusted to him. He was given a herd that was evaluated at a given price, and he was obligated to return either sheep of that value, or payment for them to their owner. (See the commentary of Rav Ovadiah of Bertinoro, Yevamot 7:1.)

If the husband did not accept responsibility for the nedunyah,³With this statement, the Rambam indicates that - in contrast to the opinion of certain authorities - the property belonging to a woman does not automatically become nichsei tzon barzel. For it to be placed in that category, the husband must explicitly accept responsibility for it (Maggid Mishneh). (See Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 85:3.) and it instead remained the property of the woman⁴With regard to this type of property as well, the husband has the privilege to manage the use of the property and reap its benefits during the time he remains married to the woman, but the property itself belongs to her. - if it decreases in value she suffers the loss, and if it increases in value the gain is hers - the property is referred to as nichsei m'log.⁵The term m'log means "to pull out hairs" (Jerusalem Talmud, Yevamot 7:1). Just as a person pulls out the hairs from a head, leaving it uncovered, so too, the husband continues to use his wife's property even though its value depreciates.

2. Similarly, all the property that a woman owns that she did not bring to her husband's household, nor had written in her ketubah, but rather left as her own, or property that came to her as an inheritance, or that was given to her as a present - all of this is referred to as nichsei m'log, for it is all in her possession.

The term ketubah, by contrast, refers only to the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract - i.e., 100 [zuz for a non-virgin] or 200 [zuz for a virgin] and the additional amount that [the husband promised].⁶By making a distinction between the money due a woman by virtue of her ketubah and her nedunyah, the Rambam is emphasizing that they are governed by different laws. With regard to the money of the ketubah, the husband or his estate is granted certain leniencies. But with regard to the nedunyah, by contrast, the woman is considered the same as any other of her husband's creditors (Maggid Mishneh). The Beit Yosef and the Ramah (Even HaEzer 100:2) quote this explanation.

3. We have already explained that our Sages established the fundamental requirement of the marriage contract, and that the laws governing the additional amount [promised by the husband] are the same as those governing the fundamental requirement.⁷See Chapter 10, Halachah 7.

[Our Sages] did not grant a woman the option of collecting [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah whenever she desired. Instead, it is like a debt, which is not payable until a given date. For a ketubah, the time when payment is due is not until after the woman's husband dies or divorces her.

Similarly, our Sages ordained that if a husband has fields [of varying quality] - good, bad and intermediate - when the woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from this property, she is entitled to collect only from the inferior fields.⁸Although a creditor has the right to collect his due from the properties of intermediate value, the woman is given this disadvantage. The rationale is that a woman desires to marry and therefore is willing to accept this stipulation (Gittin 50a). They are referred to as ziboorit.⁹The Aruch HaShalem interprets this term as being derived from an Arab word meaning "a rocky field." The Ramah (Choshen Mishpat 101:5) states that it refers to a bee that stings and is therefore considered one of the lower forms of life.

4. Similarly, our Sages ordained that when a woman comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah after her husband's death, she may not collect [this sum] until she takes an oath while holding a sacred article,¹⁰I.e., a Torah scroll, as mentioned in Hilchot Sh'vuot 11:8. An oath is required because the woman is seeking to collect money from an estate bequeathed to heirs, and whenever payment is to be collected from an estate, an oath is necessary (Ketubot 87a; Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:1). that her husband did not leave any property in her possession,¹¹The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) states that the woman must also take an oath that she did not seize any of her husband's property. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:2) quotes this view. that she had not sold her ketubah to him, nor waived payment of it.¹²In contrast to the opinion of the Tur (loc. cit.) and the Hagahot Maimoniot, the Rambam maintains that even if a woman is in possession of her ketubah, she is required to take these oaths. (See Halachah 21.) The Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.) mentions the Rambam's view, but appears to favor that of the Tur. [Her wardrobe, even] the garments she is wearing should be evaluated and the sum deducted from [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.¹³This refers to a trousseau given to the woman by her husband. Although the husband gave his wife these clothes as a gift, he did not give them to her with the intent that she take them and leave his household (Ketubot 54a).

If, however, he voluntarily divorces her, she may collect [the money due her] without taking an oath,¹⁴In the first half of this halachah, the oath is instituted by the court to protect the interests of the heirs. In this instance, however, unless the husband himself issues a claim requiring an oath (see Halachah 19), no oath is required. nor should [her wardrobe] be evaluated.¹⁵From Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 1:5, it appears that this does not apply to a woman's Sabbath and festival clothing, or to her jewelry. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 99:1) states that those articles should be evaluated and deducted from the sum due her by virtue of her ketubah. [The rationale is that] he bought them for her, she acquired them, and it is he who desires to divorce her, and not the reverse.¹⁶If, however, the husband is compelled to divorce his wife, her wardrobe should be evaluated and deducted from the money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Maggid Mishneh; see Ketubot 77a).

5. Similarly, [our Sages] ordained that a widow¹⁷This restriction applies to a widow, but not to a divorcee. The Rashba and other authorities differ and maintain that the same ruling applies to a divorcee. It appears that it is their opinion that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:1). should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from landed property only.¹⁸I.e., and not from movable property. This ruling also applies to other creditors, as stated in Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:11. (See, however, Halachah 7 below.) [Moreover,] she may not collect [her due] from the increment in the value of that property after the husband died.¹⁹E.g., a woman was owed 200 zuz by virtue of her ketubah. Her husband's property was worth 150 zuz at the time of his death. Although its value rose afterwards to 200, the woman is entitled to only 150, because that was its value at the time of her husband's death. Similarly, after their father's death, [the woman's] daughters do not receive their subsistence²⁰This is one of the conditions of a woman's ketubah. from the increment in the value of that property after his death.

Similarly, a woman may not collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from the increment in the value of [landed] property accomplished through the efforts of a purchaser, although other creditors are entitled to collect their due from that increment.²¹Landed property that was owned by a man at the time of his marriage or acceptance of a financial obligation is considered to be on lien to his wife or to his creditor. Even if it is sold to another person, the debt can be collected from it, if the person or his estate has no other property, as stated in Halachah 10. (See also Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh, Chapter 19.)

As mentioned in Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 21:1, a creditor is entitled to collect not only the property itself, but also any increment in its value, whether an increment that comes naturally, or even one that results because of effort on the part of the purchaser. A woman is not, however, given this privilege with regard to the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. These rulings are among the leniencies [granted with regard to the the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah.

6. Similarly, among the leniencies [granted with regard to the payment of the money due a woman by virtue] of her ketubah is that a woman will collect the money due her from the coinage that is of least value.

What is implied? A man married a woman in one country and divorced her in another. If the coinage of the country in which the couple married is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they divorced, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they divorced. If, by contrast, the coinage of the country in which the couple divorced is more valuable than the coinage of the country in which they married, he may pay her with the coinage of the country in which they married.²²I.e., the woman's ketubah mentioned 200 silver coins without specifying the type of coin, and there was a difference between the value of the silver coins used in the country where the ketubah was written and those used in the country where the divorce takes place. If this were a loan contract, we would say that the intent is the coins of the country in which the loan was given. As a leniency to the husband, however, the law is different with regard to a ketubah, and he is obligated to pay only the lesser of the two values.

The Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:5) state that this law applies only when the value of the money the woman receives is not less than 100 zuz of the Talmudic period for a non-virgin, and 200 zuz for a virgin.

When does the above apply? When her ketubah states a sum of coins without specification. If, however, a specific type of coin is explicitly mentioned, whether with regard to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah, or with regard to the extra amount added by the husband, the law is the same as when a person lends a colleague a specific type of coin - he must return the loan in the coinage that he took, as will be explained in Hilchot Halva'ah.²³Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 4:11.

7. The geonim of all the yeshivot ordained that after the death of a man, a woman should be able to collect her [money due her by virtue of her] ketubah from movable property,²⁴The Maggid Mishneh explains that this ruling reflects a difference in the socio-economic status of the Jewish people. Land was commonly owned in the Talmudic period, and hence a woman would not feel secure unless the obligation of her ketubah were supported by land. In contrast, the ownership of land was less common in the era of the geonim. Movable property, thus, rose in importance, and a woman would feel secure even when an obligation was supported only by movable property. just as they ordained that a creditor can collect the debt owed him from movable property.²⁵See Hilchot Nizkei Mammon 8:12. This mandate spread throughout the majority of the Jewish people.²⁶Since it was accepted by the majority of the Jewish people, it should be adhered to. See, however, the following halachot.

Similarly, the other conditions of a woman's ketubah are governed by the same rules as [the fundamental requirement of] the ketubah, and they are binding on the movable property of the deceased's estate, as well as on the landed property. There is, however, one exception - the right of the sons to inherit their mother's ketubah. Since the custom of granting them this inheritance was not universally accepted by all the yeshivot,²⁷I.e., in certain places this practice was not followed. Although the Rambam maintains that the sons should be granted that privilege, their rights should not be extended beyond their original scope. I maintain that the law of the Talmud should be applied in this instance, and they should inherit the money due their mother by virtue of her ketubah only from the landed property [within the estate].²⁸The Rambam's opinion is accepted by many authorities. Nevertheless, there are dissenting views. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 111:14) mentions both views without appearing to favor either one.

8. In all the [Jewish] communities of which I know and have heard reports from, it has already become the custom to write the ketubah so that [its obligations are binding] on both the landed property and the movable property [in the estate].²⁹See the Rambam's text of the ketubah, Hilchot Yibbum 4:33.

[Making] this addition is a great asset; it was ordained by learned men of great stature. For it is a monetary stipulation, and thus a widow is entitled to collect [the money due her] from the movable property [in her husband's] estate by virtue of this stipulation, and not by virtue of the mandate of the later sages.³⁰A person has the license to bind his estate to a particular obligation, although he would not be required to pay it by law. Once he makes such a commitment, his estate is bound by it.

9. [The following rules apply when] this stipulation was not included in the text of the ketubah, but instead [the couple] married without making an explicit statement [in this regard]. If the husband knew of this ordinance established by the geonim, the woman may collect [the money due her from the movable property in his estate].

If, however, he was not [aware of this ordinance], or we are unsure whether he knew of it, we deliberate at length concerning this matter. For an ordinance of the geonim does not have the power to be applied and to have money expropriated from the heirs because of it, when it was not explicitly stated, as is the law regarding the conditions of the ketubah.³¹The Kessef Mishneh explains that in the Rambam's era, the observance of this ordinance had not spread throughout the entire Jewish world. Note the introduction to the Mishneh Torah which states that, in contrast to the ordinances of the Sages of the Talmud, an ordinance instituted by the geonim is not binding unless its observance has spread throughout the entire Jewish people.

The Chelkat Mechokek 100:2 and the Beit Shmuel 100:2 emphasize that the observance of this ordinance spread in the subsequent generations, and it is now universal Jewish practice. Therefore, it is binding even when it was not explicitly stated in the ketubah, and the husband's heirs claim that he was unaware of it. [The distinction between the two is that the conditions of the ketubah] are ordinances instituted by the Great Sanhedrin.

10. Our Sages also ordained that all of a husband's property should be on lien for the woman's ketubah. Even if the woman's ketubah is [only 100 zuz] and [her husband] owns property worth several thousand gold pieces, it is all under lien to her ketubah.

[Her husband] is entitled to sell all his property if he desires, and his sale is binding. Nevertheless, all the property that he sells after his marriage can be expropriated [from the purchaser] by his widow [in lieu of payment for] her ketubah when he divorces her or when he dies, if he does not possess property that has not been sold.³²If, however, the husband or his estate possesses property that has not been sold, neither the woman nor another creditor may expropriate property that has already been sold (Gittin 5:2).

When a woman expropriates property [from a purchaser], she must take an oath holding a sacred article, as is taken by any of [a person's] creditors [who seek to expropriate property from its purchasers]. This provision was instituted so that he should not view [the obligation of] the ketubah lightly.

11. When the court or the heirs require a widow to take an oath when she comes to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, the oath should be taken only outside the court.³³Rashi, the Ramban and the Rashba state that when an oath is made outside the court, God's name is not mentioned, and a Torah scroll is not held. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:19) quotes this view. The Maggid Mishneh states, however, that the fact that the Rambam does not mention such a distinction indicates that he does not accept this concept. For the court would refrain from administering the oath, lest she not be precise with herself when making it.³⁴Gittin 35a explains that since a widow carries out certain activities on behalf of the heirs of her deceased husband's estate (who are, in most instances, her children), she feels free to take certain articles belonging to the estate, without taking this into consideration. Hence, she might be ready to take an oath that she did not benefit from the estate, when in fact she did.

Since the sin of - and the punishment for - taking a false oath is very harsh, our Sages wished to reduce this severity by having the oath administered outside the court.

If the heirs desired that she make a vow [instead of an oath], she may make a vow linked to any object they desire.³⁵I.e., the woman will vow never to eat bread on the condition that she benefited from property belonging to the estate. Breaking a vow is considered a less severe transgression than taking a false oath. This vow may be administered in a court. Afterwards, she should collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

12. If a widow dies before taking this oath, her heirs should not inherit her ketubah at all, for she does not have any rights to her ketubah until she takes an oath.³⁶This principle applies universally: Whenever a person is entitled to property only after taking an oath, that property is not transferred to the person's heirs if the oath had not been taken (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 96:1).

If the woman marries [a second time] before taking an oath [with regard to [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from her previous husband's estate], she may take an oath after her remarriage and collect her due whenever she desires. She does not, however, have the option of making a vow, lest her [second] husband annul it.³⁷Since the woman's second husband has the option of annulling any vows made by his wife, it is possible that she will take a false vow, relying on her husband to nullify it (Gittin 35b).

13. If [a woman's husband] designated a plot of land for her in her ketubah, whether he specified [only] one of its borders or all four of its borders, she may collect her ketubah from this plot of land without taking an oath.

Similarly, if he specified movable property [in the ketubah] and this movable property exists, she may take it without taking an oath. [Moreover,] if the [movable property that was specified] was sold and other movable property purchased with the proceeds, it being known that these goods were purchased with the proceeds of [the movable property specified in the ketubah], she may take them without taking an oath.

14. A woman who diminishes [the amount of money due her by virtue of] her ketubah may collect her due only after taking an oath.³⁸Our Sages required the woman to take an oath because they were not sure that she made a complete account of the money she received. Requiring her to take an oath insures that she will, in fact, be careful regarding this account (Ketubot 87b).

What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims to have received only a portion of the amount. Even if there are witnesses who testify that she received the amount that she admits to having received,³⁹The fact that witnesses were made to observe payment of one portion of the ketubah is no proof that a second payment was not made without being observed by witnesses. and even if she is extremely precise in accounting what she took, mentioning even [the last] half-p'rutah, she may collect the remainder only after taking an oath.⁴⁰The fact that she appears precise in reporting what she admits to having received is not proof that she has made a totally precise accounting (Ketubot, loc. cit.).

Similar laws apply to a creditor who states that he is actually owed a lesser amount than is stated in the contract of loan (Hilchot Malveh V'Loveh 14:1).

15. [An oath is also required in the following instance.] The husband claims that [his wife] received all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah], while the woman claims not to have received the money, and one witness testifies that she received either the entire sum or a portion of it. [The woman] may collect the entire [sum mentioned in] the ketubah, but only after taking an oath.⁴¹Since the husband has only one witness to support his claim, and the woman's claim is supported by her ketubah, she is entitled to collect her full claim. Nevertheless, because of the witness, an oath is required.

16. [When a divorcee collects [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah] outside the presence of her husband, she must take an oath before doing so.

What is implied? A man divorced his wife and departed. After his wife takes an oath, the court should expropriate his property and give [the woman the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

The above applies when the husband is in a distant place, where there is difficulty in notifying him. If, however, he is in a nearby place [where it is possible] to notify him, a message should be sent to notify him [of the court's impending action]. If he does not come, the woman should take the oath and collect [her due].

17. A woman who reduces the value of her ketubah is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].⁴²In contrast to a woman who diminishes the amount of money due her by virtue of her ketubah (Halachah 14), this woman does not admit receiving any funds. Hence, there is no need to require an oath so that she will make a careful account (Bayit Chadash, Even HaEzer 96).

What is implied? A woman produces a ketubah that states [that she is due] 1000 zuz. Her husband claims that she received the entire amount, while she claims not to have received anything at all, but she admits: "I am owed only 500 zuz. Although he wrote 1000 for me [in the ketubah], there was an understanding between me and him [concerning this]." In this instance, she is not required to take an oath before collecting [her due].

If, however, [in the above situation,] the woman says: "My ketubah states only 500 zuz," she may not collect with this document that says [she is due] 1000 zuz, for she has negated it. It is as if she has admitted that it is false. Therefore, [the husband] may take a rabbinic oath [to support his claim]; he is then freed [of all obligations].

18. Whenever we have stated that a woman may not collect [her due] unless she takes an oath, the court tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." Whenever we said that she may collect her due without an oath, [the court] tells the husband: "Give her [what is due her]. Your claim is not acceptable until you bring proof to support it."

19. If [in the latter instances], on his own initiative, the husband asks that [the woman] take an oath [denying] his claim, [the court] tells her: "Take the oath and collect [your due]." She must take this oath holding a sacred article.

If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from him [in the event of a divorce] without taking any oath at all. [In the event of his death,] however, she must take an oath before collecting [her due] from his heirs.⁴³Unless a specific statement was made to that effect, the stipulation that her husband accepted at the time of the composition of the ketubah applies only to himself and not to his heirs.

20. If, [originally,] she made a stipulation with [her husband] enabling her to collect [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah from his heirs without taking an oath, or that her word would be accepted by his heirs regardless of what she claims, she may collect [her due] from the heirs without taking any oath at all.⁴⁴The Rambam's opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 98:6). The Ramah, however, cites the opinion of Rabbenu Asher and other Ashkenazic authorities, who maintain that the husband's stipulation is not binding upon his heirs.

If, however, she comes to collect [her due] from property that has been sold, she must take an oath before collecting. Although her husband was willing to accept her word, the stipulation he made is binding only on himself and [the estate he left to] his heirs. It does not have the power to cause others to incur a financial loss.⁴⁵The Ra'avad maintains that the woman's claim should be accepted without an oath. Since the husband made such a stipulation, it would have become public knowledge. Any person who purchased the property knew about the matter and accepted the risk. It is, however, the Rambam's ruling that is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.).

21. A widow who is in possession of her [the document recording her] ketubah may collect her due, after taking an oath, even though 100 years have passed since her husband's death.⁴⁶The fact that she maintained possession of her ketubah indicates that her delay in presenting her claim does not indicate a willingness to forego it. This applies regardless of whether she resides in her [deceased] husband's home or in her father's home.⁴⁷This distinction is, however, relevant in Halachah 23.

If, however, she does not have possession of her ketubah, she is not entitled to anything, even if she makes her claim on the day her husband dies.⁴⁸For perhaps she has already received the money due her by virtue of her ketubah, or she has waived payment of this debt.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 100:6) quotes the Rambam's rulings. The Ramah quotes rulings that allow the woman to collect the money due her even in such an instance. Nevertheless, he states that the prevailing custom is not to allow a woman to collect her claim unless she is in possession of her ketubah. Similarly, a divorcee is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until she produces her ketubah.

22. When does the above apply? In a place where it is customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah. [Different rules apply,] however, in a place where it is not customary to compose a document [recording] the ketubah, and instead, [the couple] rely on the conditions established by the Jewish court.⁴⁹In the Talmudic period, there were places where it was not customary to compose a written document spelling out the marriage contract. Nevertheless, it was understood by both the husband and the wife that the financial dimensions of their marriage would be governed by the rules expressed in our Sages' requirements for the ketubah.

[In such a situation, the woman is entitled to] collect the essential requirement of the ketubah⁵⁰When the husband claims to have paid the woman her due, he must prove his assertion. Otherwise, the woman's claim is accepted (Maggid Mishneh). even when she is not in possession of a document recording the ketubah, regardless of whether she was widowed or divorced, or whether she [continues to] reside in her husband's home or [has returned to] her father's home. She is not, however, given [anything she claims her husband promised her] in addition unless she has definite proof [of such an obligation].⁵¹This amount is granted the woman voluntarily by her husband and is not required by Jewish law. Therefore, unless the woman has proof that the commitment was made, she is not entitled to collect anything from her husband (Maggid Mishneh).

The Tur (Even HaEzer 100) states that even if a woman can prove that her husband made a commitment for an additional amount to her at the time of the marriage, she must also prove that this commitment was not met.

23. Until when is a widow entitled to collect the essential requirement of the ketubah⁵²The Tur (Even HaEzer 101) maintains that the Rambam's wording indicates that even if she remains silent, she foregoes only the essential requirement of the ketubah, but not the additional commitment that her husband made. However, Rav Yosef Karo dismisses this interpretation in the Kessef Mishneh and does not mention it in the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 101). in a place where it is not customary to compose a ketubah? If she [continues to reside] in her husband's home, there is no limit on the time she is granted.⁵³As reflected in the conclusion of this halachah, although a widow has the right to continue dwelling in her deceased husband's home, the heirs also have the right to dwell there. Since she is deriving her subsistence from them, she is ashamed to demand payment of her due from them. If she [resides] in her father's home,⁵⁴Or she remarries (Ramah, Even HaEzer 101:1). [she has this prerogative] for twenty-five years.

If, [however,] she comes to collect [the money due her because of her ketubah] after twenty-five years, she is not entitled to anything. [The rationale is that] had she not foregone [the money due her], she would not have remained silent for this long. Nor is she living together with the heirs, so that she could [excuse her silence,] explaining that she was embarrassed to sue them while she was living together with them in [one] home.

24. For this reason, if [one of] the heirs was in the habit of bringing her subsistence while she was residing in her father's home and caring for her needs, she has the prerogative of demanding [her due] even after twenty-five years have passed. The reason why she remained silent and did not present her claim is that she was ashamed [to sue] the heir.

25. [The following rules apply when there is a difference between the claims of a husband - or his heirs - and his wife regarding the size of the essential requirement of her ketubah.] She says, "I was a virgin when I married, and the essential requirement of my ketubah is 200 [zuz]." Her husband or his heirs claim, "She was not a virgin, and she is due only 100."

If there are witnesses who saw that the customs that people in that locale carry out when virgins are wed were carried out on her behalf - e.g., there were different types of celebrations, [she wore a] crown or a particular garment [designated for this purpose], or other rites that are performed only for the sake of virgins were performed [for her] - she is entitled to 200 [zuz]. If there are no witnesses to this, she is entitled to only 100 [zuz].

[In the latter instance,] if her husband is alive, she can require him to take an oath required by the Torah,⁵⁵Objections to this statement are raised by the Ra'avad, Rav Moshe HaCohen and others. The claim for which the husband is required to take an oath involves a liability for which landed property is under lien. In such instances, a Torah oath is never administered. The Tur (Even HaEzer 96) and others, therefore, maintain that a rabbinic oath (sh'vuat hesset) is administered.

The Maggid Mishneh explains that the Rambam is referring to an instance in his time, when, as stated in Halachot 8-9, the lien of the ketubah applies to movable as well as landed property. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh's explanation is challenged by other authorities, and even the Maggid Mishneh himself raises questions. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 96:16) mentions both opinions. for he has acknowledged a portion of a claim.

[In cases of this nature,] testimony is accepted [from a person]⁵⁶As in all cases of Torah law, the testimony of two witnesses is required in this instance. The Maggid Mishneh states that according to the Rambam, both of these witnesses may have witnessed the events under consideration when they were minors. In both the Kessef Mishneh and in the Shulchan Aruch (loc. cit.), Rav Yosef Karo differs and states that it is acceptable if one of these witnesses observed the events as a minor, but the other must have been past majority at that time. once he became an adult, who says: "I remember that when I was a child, the rites performed for virgin brides were performed on behalf of such and such."⁵⁷Generally, a witness's testimony is not accepted unless he is past majority - not only at the time he testifies in court, but also at the time he sees the event under discussion. In this instance, however, leniency is granted, because we rely on the fact that, by and large, most women are virgins when they marry. Moreover, the obligation of the ketubah is a point of Rabbinic law (Ketubot 28a; Hilchot Edut 14:3).

As mentioned, all the above applies [only] in places where it is customary not to compose a document recording the ketubah.⁵⁸For if a ketubah was composed, the text of the ketubah will clarify the matter. There is, however, an instance where this ruling would be applicable in a place where it is customary to compose a ketubah: an instance where the woman brings witnesses who testify that her ketubah was lost (Maggid Mishneh).

26. When a woman tells her husband, "You divorced me," her word is accepted. [The rationale is that if this were not the truth,] she would not speak so boldly to her husband.⁵⁹The simple meaning of the Rambam's words is that if a woman makes such a statement, she is free to marry another person. As in Chapter 4, Halachah 13, the Ra'avad differs, explaining that the woman's statements are accepted only after the fact - i.e., after she has already married another person - and only insomuch as to require that other person to divorce her.

The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:2) quotes the Rambam's view, while the Ra'avad's position is quoted by the Ramah. The Ramah also mentions that in the present age, since brash conduct has become more widespread, this claim is no longer accepted when presented by a woman. The Beit Shmuel 17:4 mentions that, at present, since it is customary for a record of divorces to be kept by the rabbinical court that issues them, this claim is no longer accepted. This is particularly true in the present age, when record-keeping and communication have advanced.

Accordingly, when a woman produces her ketubah, [even] without having a bill of divorce, and tells her husband: "You divorced me. I lost my bill of divorce. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," [her claim is accepted, and her husband] is obligated to pay her the essential requirement of the marriage contract, even though he claims that he never divorced her.⁶⁰The Ra'avad and the Ramah differ, as above. He is not, however, [obligated to] give her the additional amount he promised,⁶¹The essential requirement of the ketubah is an obligation imposed by our Sages, granted so that she would have the means to marry another person in the case of divorce or widowhood. Hence, since she is granted the opportunity of remarrying in this instance, she is also entitled to the money due her by virtue of the ketubah. The additional amount, by contrast, is not an obligation, but rather a present promised by her husband. It is self-understood that he did not make this promise to enable her to marry another man, when he does not admit that a divorce took place (Maggid Mishneh). unless she brings proof that she has been divorced, or she manifests possession of both the bill of divorce and her ketubah.

27. [In the above situation,] if [the woman's] husband said: "This is what happened. I divorced her and paid her all [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah, both the essential requirement and the additional amount. She wrote me a receipt, but I lost it" [the following rules apply]. He requires her to take an oath while holding a sacred article [that he is liable to pay her] the essential requirement [of the ketubah], and then he must give her [that sum].⁶²The authorities who free the husband of obligation in the previous halachah also free him of all liability in this instance (Chelkat Mechokek 100:40; Beit Shmuel 100:40).

With regard to the additional amount, his word is accepted. [The rationale is that] he could have claimed that he never divorced her, and in such an instance he would not be held liable for the additional amount. [We assume that had he desired to lie, he would have used that alternative.] He is, however, required to take a rabbinic oath with regard to the additional amount.

28. [The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce, but does not have her ketubah in her possession. If the local custom is not to compose a ketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of] the bill of divorce she is holding. If, however, it is the local custom to compose a ketubah, she is not entitled even to the fundamental requirement of the ketubah until she produces her ketubah, as was explained.⁶³Halachot 21-22. Her husband must take a rabbinic oath denying her claim, and he is freed of liability.

29. [When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and two ketubot, she is entitled to collect the amount due her by virtue of both ketubot.⁶⁴We assume that the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, the couple remarried, and the husband subsequently divorced her a second time, without paying her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. If she produces two ketubot and one bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect only [the money due her for] one ketubah.⁶⁵The laws that follow apply when the dates of both the ketubot precede the date of the bill of divorce, and thus it is apparent that the woman was divorced only once.

Which ketubah should she collect? If they are both for the same amount, the later ketubah negates the earlier one, and she is entitled to collect [property that was sold to others] from the date of the later [ketubah].⁶⁶As mentioned previously, all of a husband's property is under lien to the ketubah. Therefore, if he sells his landed property to others and he does not possess sufficient property after the divorce to give his wife her due, she may collect that money by expropriating property that was sold. In this instance, we say that the woman waived payment of her ketubah originally to free from the lien property that was sold. Afterwards, her husband wrote her a second ketubah for the same amount. If one of them is for a greater sum than the other, she may collect whichever she desires, and the other one is voided.⁶⁷In this instance, we assume that the husband wrote the woman a second ketubah that would preempt the first one. In this instance, the woman has the choice of selecting which ketubah she desires - the one with the greater sum, or the one that is dated first and thus gives her greater power with regard to the expropriation of property that has been sold.

30. [When] a woman produces two bills of divorce and one ketubah, she has [the right to collect] only [the amount due her by virtue of] one ketubah.⁶⁸As reflected in the continuation of the Rambam's statements, this refers to a situation in which the man divorced his wife and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her without composing a second ketubah. For when a man divorces his wife and remarries her without specifying any conditions, [it can be assumed] that he remarried her with the intent that her original ketubah [become binding again].

[The following rules apply when] a woman produces a bill of divorce and a ketubah after the death of her husband: If the bill of divorce is dated prior to the ketubah,⁶⁹We assume that her husband divorced her and did not pay her the money due her by virtue of her ketubah. Afterwards, he remarried her and composed a ketubah. [in a place where] it is not customary to compose a ketubah, she is entitled to collect the essential requirement of her ketubah by [virtue of this] bill of divorce,⁷⁰As explained in Halachah 28. and she is entitled to collect the entire sum [mentioned] in the second ketubah, for she acquires this sum by virtue of [her husband's] death.

If her ketubah is dated prior to the bill of divorce, she is entitled to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah only once. [We assume] that when he remarried her, his intent was that her original ketubah [become binding again].

31. A woman's word is accepted if she says: "My husband died," so that she [be granted permission to] remarry, as will be explained in Hilchot Gerushin.⁷¹Chapter 12, Halachah 15. (See also Hilchot Nachalot 7:2.) One of the conditions of the ketubah is that if a woman remarries after the death of her husband, she is entitled to collect the entire sum written in her ketubah.

Therefore, if she came to the court and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry," without mentioning [the collection of the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah at all, she is granted permission to remarry. [Afterwards,] she is required to take an oath,⁷²I.e., the oath made by all widows before collecting the money due them by virtue of their ketubah (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh), in contrast to the opinion of the Tur (Even HaEzer 100), who requires the woman to take an oath that her husband died. (See Chelkat Mechokek 17:83.) and then she is given [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.

If she says, "My husband died. Give me the money due me by virtue of my ketubah," [not only is she not granted this money,] she is not even permitted to remarry. [We assume that] she came [only] because of the matter of the ketubah. Our presumption is that her husband has not died. Her intent is not to remarry, but merely to collect [the money due her by virtue of] the ketubah during [her husband's] lifetime.

If she came and said: "My husband died. Grant me permission to remarry and give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah," she is permitted to remarry and is granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah. The rationale is that her primary intent is remarriage. If, however, she comes and says: "My husband died. Give me [the money due me by virtue of] my ketubah, and grant me permission to remarry," she is permitted to remarry, but she is not granted [the money due her by virtue of] her ketubah.⁷³This is a question that is left unresolved by the Talmud (Yevamot 117a). The Rambam rules that since the matter is very severe - if the woman remarries, and it is discovered that she lied, she will be prohibited to remain married to both her first or second husbands, and her children from her second husband will be considered illegitimate - and if her first husband is alive, it is likely that the fact will be discovered - in theory, the woman should be allowed to remarry. Because she mentions her ketubah, however, there is a doubt, and because of the doubt, the money in question is allowed to remain in the hands of the party in whose possession it is at the time the question is raised - i.e., the heirs. That doubt, however, applies only to the financial dimension of the relationship, and not to the permission to remarry (Kessef Mishneh).

Rabbenu Asher differs and maintains that the doubt raised by the Talmud also applies with regard to the woman's permission to remarry. Both opinions are mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 17:44), although it appears that the Rambam's approach is favored. If, however, she seizes possession [of this sum], the court should not expropriate it from her possession.