1. [When a man] divorces his wife and [asserts that the divorce] will not take effect until a specific time passes, the divorce takes effect when that time arrives. Thus, this resembles [a get given on] a conditional basis, and yet it is not a conditional get.

It resembles [a get given on] a conditional basis because the divorce takes effect when the specified time arrives [as in the case of a conditional get, which is completed when the condition is fulfilled]. Nevertheless, it is not considered a conditional get because a person who divorces [his wife] conditionally has already performed the divorce, and in this instance, the man has not divorced her until the time arrives.

For this reason, a person who gives a conditional get must restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], while this person does not have to restate his words. Nor must he comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained.¹See the notes on Chapter 8, Halachah 1..

2. What is implied? [When a husband] tells his wife: "This is your get, but the divorce does not take effect until 30 days pass," she is not divorced until after the passage of 30 days. If her husband dies, or the get is lost or consumed by fire in the interim, she is not divorced.²If the husband dies she is not divorced, because a divorce must take effect before death. If the get is destroyed, she is not divorced because it is the get that serves as the medium of divorce, and at the time when the get must take effect, it no longer exists.

3. [When the woman] went and placed [the get] in [a place] at the side of the public domain,³The public domain was a marketplace with pillars on either side. At the side of the pillars, there was space that though ownerless, could be used to acquire property, because it was not common for people to walk in that space. (See Hilchot Gezelah Va'Avedah 17:9.) and after 30 days passed it was stolen or lost, the divorce is effective. Since the get existed on the day when it took effect, and it was set aside in a designated place that is not public domain [it can serve as the medium for the divorce].⁴The Maggid Mishneh, the Kessef Mishneh and others contrast the Rambam's ruling here, that the divorce is not retroactively effective from the time the husband gave the get, to his ruling in Hilchot Mechirah 2:9. That source states that a sale can be effective when made with the stipulation that it take effect after 30 days, only when the stipulation is that it take effect retroactively. The Maggid Mishneh differentiates between the two instances, explaining that a sale requires an act of contract to effect a transfer, and that act took place when the sale was originally made, not 30 days afterwards. In contrast, with regard to a get, the fundamental aspect of the divorce is effected by the writing of the get. [The governing principle is that the area at] the sides of the public domain is not the same as the public domain itself.⁵Had the get been placed by the woman in the public domain itself, it would not be effective even if it existed when the time specified by the husband arrived. Since it left the woman's domain entirely, the giving of the get originally performed by the husband is no longer considered significant. And, as stated at the beginning of these laws, one of the requirements of a divorce is that the get be given to the woman by her husband.

4. Similarly, if the husband makes the divorce dependent on an action,⁶I.e., in this instance as well, there is a resemblance to the laws of a conditional divorce. Nevertheless, since different wording is used, the laws vary. the same rules that govern a get that takes effect after a specific time apply. For example, [a husband] said to [his] wife: "This is your get, but the divorce does not take effect until you give me 200 zuz." After [the woman] gives [the money], the divorce takes effect.⁷Moreover, the action specified by the husband may be something that does not require anything to be done by his wife. For example, he may tell her that the divorce will take effect after the first rainfall (Jerusalem Talmud, Kiddushin 3:3).

In this instance [as well], there is no need to restate the condition [in both a positive and negative form], nor to comply with the other requirements of conditional agreements that we have explained. For this person has not divorced [his wife] conditionally - he has not yet divorced her at all. Instead, he made the divorce dependent on a specific action, and after [that action is completed], the divorce will take effect.

5. What is the difference between a conditional divorce and a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time, or a divorce dependent on an action? With regard to a conditional divorce, the divorce is a fact; it is, however, not completed until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, when the condition is fulfilled, the divorce takes effect as long as the get exists, even if it is not in the woman's possession. When the condition is fulfilled, there is no need for [the woman] to pick up [the get] or take possession, for it was given to her for the purpose of divorce. If she married before the condition was fulfilled, she need not leave [her second husband], as explained.⁸Chapter 8, Halachah 1. See the notes on that halachah.

With regard to a divorce that will take effect only after a fixed time or a divorce dependent on an action, by contrast, she was not given the get for the [immediate] purpose of divorce. Instead, it is considered to be an entrusted object until the specified time arrives or she performs the action. Therefore, it is necessary that the get be in her possession at that time, that she take [possession of it], or that it be in a place that she designated for it even though it is not in her domain, as we have explained.⁹Halachah 3. If the get is not in the woman's possession at this time, the divorce is not effective according to the Rambam. Nevertheless, other authorities have a different conception of these laws, and according to them, the status of the divorce would be doubtful (Maggid Mishneh; Beit Shmuel 146:3). Only then, is she divorced by virtue [of this get].

If she marries before the specified time arrives, or before she performs the action on which the divorce is dependent, she must leave her second husband,¹⁰For their relations are considered adulterous. and any child [born of their union] is considered illegitimate. For she is a married woman, and the divorce is not [yet] effective.

6. When [a man] gives his wife a get and tells her: "If you do not give me 200 zuz, this get is not effective," or "...you are not divorced," he is not considered to have performed a divorce at all.¹¹For he did not preface his statements by saying: "This is your get," or "You are divorced...." Hence, he is not considered to have given the get for the sake of divorce. Although such an intent could be deduced from his words, since his statements were not explicit, they are of no consequence. Indeed, making such a statement is less effective than not saying anything at all (Maggid Mishneh; Kiryat Melech Rav). For the get was not given on a conditional basis, nor was it made dependent on an action. The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.

7. When a person would like to give a conditional divorce, with the condition being that the divorce not take effect until a particular time, he should express the concept in a conditional statement, making the condition dependent on his departure or return at a specific time.¹²I.e., he desires that the get not take effect until a specific time, but does not want the restrictions mentioned in the previous halachah to apply. This is not merely a theoretical situation. Such gittin were given frequently in previous generations when a man undertook an overseas journey and wished to spare his wife from having to remain unmarried if he was killed, kidnapped by pirates or in other ways prevented from returning against his will.

What is implied? He tells her: "If I do not return between the present time and 30 days, this get is effective. If I do return within 30 days, this get is not effective." He [then] gives her the get. Alternatively, he should tell her: "This is your get on condition that I do not return to this country within 30 days." The same [ruling applies] in all similar situations.

8. When a person divorces [his wife] on the condition that he not return to this country within 30 days, and he set out to return within 30 days, but became ill or was prevented [from returning by a flooding] river and did not return until after 30 days, the get is effective. Even if he protests, "I am being held back by forces beyond my control" [the get is effective].¹³Gittin 30a cites an example of a man who divorced his wife on condition that he not return within 30 days. A river washed away the bridge leading to his city. Although he stood on the river banks and called to his townsmen: "See, I have returned," our Sages ruled that he is not considered to have returned, and they considered the divorce binding.

[The rationale is that the claim,] "I was prevented by forces beyond my control," is not accepted with regard to gittin,¹⁴According to Scriptural law, a person who is prevented from fulfilling a condition by forces beyond his control is not considered as having failed to fulfill it. Nevertheless, our Sages ruled that the laws of divorce are an exception to this principle, because modest women might presume that their husbands were prevented from fulfilling their condition by forces beyond their control and never remarry (Ketubot 2b).

The Maggid Mishneh quotes the opinion of Tosafot (Ketubot 2b) and others, who state that this principle applies only with regard to events beyond mortal control that one could possibly foresee - e.g., illness or flood. It does not apply with regard to events beyond a person's control that are totally unlikely - e.g., earthquakes. The Maggid Mishneh cites statements by the Rambam in Hilchot Mechirah, Chapter 19, which indicate that he would also accept this restriction.

The Maggid Mishneh's premise is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:1). It appears that the determination of what is an event beyond a person's control that is totally unlikely is dependent on the sociological conditions of the age. For example, the Ramah rules that being held as a captive is not a totally unlikely occurrence. even if the husband makes it evident that he does not desire that the divorce take effect.

9. [The following rules apply when a man gives a] divorce on the condition¹⁵As will be explained, this law applies when the husband stated "on condition that..." when giving the get. that it become effective if 30 days pass without [his seeing his wife's] face. If he repeatedly came [and appeared before her], but never entered into privacy with her, and then 30 days [passed without his seeing her], the get is effective.¹⁶Since ultimately the condition was fulfilled. Although he came [and appeared before her] within 30 days [after the get was given], since he did not enter into privacy with her,¹⁷If he entered into privacy with her, the get would be nullified. See Chapter 3, Halachah 5, Chapter 8, Halachah 2. [once the condition was fulfilled,] the get is effective.

When does the above apply? When he made the condition and said: "I accept her word with regard to [whether or] not I appeased her."¹⁸In such an instance, if the woman were to say that she never agreed to her husband's spending more than 30 days away from her, the get would be effective after the condition is fulfilled. If, however, he did not accept her word, we suspect that perhaps he placated her when he came and visited her, she was willing to forego [her desire to be with him], and he nullified the get.¹⁹The husband gave his wife the get because he was going away on a journey and knew that she would not desire to be alone. If he was able to appease her and she was willing to remain alone for 30 days, he is able to nullify the get. Usually, once a get is given "on condition that...," it cannot be nullified once it has been given. Nevertheless, in this instance, since the condition was made for the sake of the woman, if she is willing to forego seeing her husband, the husband may nullify the get (Maggid Mishneh). For this reason, the get is unacceptable [even] after 30 days [pass without the husband seeing her].²⁰I.e., according to Scriptural law, since the condition was fulfilled, and there is no evidence that the couple resolved their differences, the get is binding. Our Sages, nevertheless, disqualified the get for the reasons stated above.

Similarly, when a man tells a woman: "This is your get and [it becomes effective] after twelve months pass," if he lives in the same city as she does, we suspect that he appeased her, unless he said: "I accept her word that I did not appease her."

10. A similar [principle applies with regard to] all conditions that are dependent on her will, and the get would be nullified if she was willing to forego these conditions in favor of her husband. We suspect that perhaps he appeased her,²¹Hence, the divorce is unacceptable. unless he said: "I accept her word...."

When does the above apply? When the woman is divorced after nisu'in, for he is familiar with her.²²And we assume that because of their familiarity, he knows how to appease her, and she is more willing to accept his overtures. When, however, [a husband] divorces [his wife] after [merely] consecrating her, we do not suspect that he appeased her.

11. [When a man gives his wife a get and tells her:] "This is your get [and it is effective] from the present time onward if I do not return within twelve months," we do not suspect that perhaps he returned in secrecy, for people do not generally come in secrecy. [Therefore,] if the time period he specified passes without his coming, the divorce is effective.²³The Rambam's decision is based on his interpretation of Gittin 76b. The Ra'avad interprets that passage more stringently and requires the husband to have accepted his wife's statements as to whether or not he came as binding. Otherwise, we suspect that he came in secrecy. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:7) follows the Rambam's view, but states that a priori, it is customary to include the condition mentioned by the Ra'avad.

If he dies within the twelve months, although the divorce [will become] effective, for there is no way that he can come, if she would have been obligated to perform the rite of yibbum, she should not marry until the twelve months pass and the condition is fulfilled.²⁴If she desires to marry within the twelve months, she must undergo the rite of chalitzah first.

12. When a healthy person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the get take effect if he dies, and when a sick person [divorces his wife] on the condition that the get take effect if he dies from the illness afflicting him,²⁵The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:8) quotes the Rashba, who states that even if a sick person does not specify that he die from the illness afflicting him, we assume that this is his intent. their statements are of no consequence.²⁶I.e., the advantage of such a get would be to free his wife of the obligation of yibbum or chalitzah. Similarly, the subsequent halachot refer to gittin given for this purpose. The expression "if I die" implies [that it takes effect] after his death. [Alternatively,] the intent is that [it take effect] retroactively [if he dies]. [Because of the doubt involved,] if [a man] uses the expression "If I die...," it is considered as if he said "after my death." [The get is therefore void, because] there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.²⁷The Ra'avad differs with the Rambam's ruling. He maintains that the date of the get indicates that the husband desires that the get take effect retroactively. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:1) quotes the Rambam's view, but mentions a minority opinion that takes the Ra'avad's view into consideration.

13. If, [however, the husband] tells her: "This is your get. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time," or "...If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present day,"²⁸The Hagahot Maimoniot quote Rabbenu Tam as stating that it is preferable for the person to say: "from the present time," rather than "from the present day," lest he die before the conclusion of the day. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:2) quotes this suggestion. the get is valid. When he dies, [his wife] is divorced.

14. [If a husband] says: "This is your get. If I die, [it is effective retroactively] from the present time - or from the present day - after my death," when [the husband] dies, the status of his wife's divorce is in doubt.²⁹Therefore, if childless, she must perform the rite of chalitzah before marrying, and may not perform the rite of yibbum. As stated in Hilchot Ishut 18:25, such a woman is not entitled to receive support from her husband's estate after his death. [We suspect that] perhaps, after saying "from the present time," he changed his mind and [did not desire that the get become effective] from the present time, and instead take effect after his death. And there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.

15. [If a husband] says: "This is your get. [It becomes effective] when the sun emerges from its shield," it is not effective if he dies that night.³⁰For the get does not become effective until the morning. Since he died beforehand, a get cannot be effective after death. [If he gave the get] on the condition that the sun shine and he dies that night, the get is effective, for when the sun shines [on the following day], the condition that he established becomes fulfilled.³¹For a get given "on the condition that" becomes effective retroactively from the time it was originally given, once the condition is fulfilled.

If [the husband gives a get and] establishes a condition: "If the sun shines, the get is effective. But if it does not shine, it is not effective," [the get] is not effective if he dies at night. For the condition was not fulfilled until after he died,³²A get given according to the rules of conditional agreements is not effective until the condition is fulfilled. and there is no concept of divorce after a person's death.

16. When a person who is mortally ill has a get written for his wife and divorces her and then recovers, he cannot retract the divorce. A divorce [performed by a person in such a state] is not [governed by] the same laws as a present he gives.³³As stated in Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:14, when a person who is mortally ill gives away all of his property as a present and then recovers, the present is automatically retracted, for we assume that his intent was solely to distribute his property after his death. [The rationale for this distinction is] that if he were given the prerogative of retracting, the divorce would appear to take effect after death, in the same way that a present he gives is not legally transferred until after death.³⁴Thus, the two laws are in direct contradiction. A present given by a dying man does not take effect until after he dies, and a divorce that he grants cannot take effect after he dies.

17. [If a husband says:] "This is your get. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake, devoured by a lion or dies because of other similar causes, the divorce is not effective.³⁵For the condition that he stated was not fulfilled (Gittin 73a).

18. [If, by contrast,] he tells her: "...if I do not arise from this sickness," and his house collapses upon him, he is bit by a snake or devoured by a lion, the status of the divorce is in doubt.³⁶On the one hand, he did not arise from his sickbed. On the other hand, there is reason to assume that his intent was that he is giving the get on the condition that he die from the illness afflicting him, and this was not the case (Gittin 73a).

[The following rules apply when a husband tells his wife:] "Here is your get. [It is effective retroactively] from the present day if I die from this illness," and then rises [from his sickbed], walks in the marketplace,³⁷This applies even if he walks in the marketplace without any support. Since he did not regain his health entirely, it is necessary to determine whether or not he died from the first illness. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:26. and afterwards falls ill and dies. We make an assessment. If he died from the first illness, the divorce is effective. If not, it is not effective. If he progresses from one illness to another illness,³⁸Note the Beit Shmuel 145:14, who states that, according to the Rambam, for the divorce to be effective the man must still be afflicted with the first illness when he dies. Note the contrast to Hilchot Zechiyah UMatanah 8:27. and does not arise [and walk] in the marketplace, the divorce is effective. There is no need to make an assessment.

19. With regard to all the conditions [mentioned above], during the days between the giving of the get and his death [with its consequent] fulfillment of the condition, she is considered to be a divorced woman with regard to all matters,³⁹I.e., he has none of the privileges of a husband - e.g., he is not entitled to her earnings, he may not nullify her vows, and if he is a priest, he may not become impure because of her in the event of her death. With regard to paying for the woman's support, most authorities maintain that the husband is liable. There is no explicit statement from the Rambam regarding this issue. provided he does not enter into privacy with her, as explained.⁴⁰In such an instance, we suspect that the couple may have engaged in marital relations, and that the husband nullified the get beforehand.

20. [The following rules apply when] a sick person desires to divorce his wife conditionally, so that if he dies she will not be obligated to perform the rite of yibbum, but if he recovers, the divorce will not be effective; he does not desire that the get take effect [retroactively] from the time he gives it, lest the matter be overly disturbing for him.

He should write the following in the get after writing the essential portion; alternatively, he should make these statements when he gives [his wife] the get: "If I do not die, this get will not be effective. If I die, this get will be effective. If I do not die, this get will not be effective." In this manner, the conditional factor is repeated. The positive factor is stated before the negative factor,⁴¹I.e., the requirement is not that the positive factor be stated first, but that it be stated before the negative factor. This is accomplished by restating the condition that would negate the get. and the person's opening remarks do not speak of misfortune.

[If a get is given with such a condition,] the divorce will take effect when [the husband] dies,⁴²The Maggid Mishneh questions the Rambam's ruling, noting that from his previous decisions, it appears that unless the man says that the get will take effect retroactively me'achshav, "from this time onward," the get is not effective, because it does not take effect until after the man's death. Apparently, the Rambam maintains that the restatement of the condition resolves that difficulty, but this concept is not accepted by many other authorities. When stating this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 145:5) quotes the Rambam's wording, but adds the word me'achshav. provided that the get reaches the woman before his death.

21. When a husband tells a colleague:⁴³I.e., the colleague was not appointed by the wife to serve as an agent to receive the get. The husband appointed him as her agent, because he felt that she would not desire to marry her yavam. According to Torah law, one may perform an action on a person's behalf without his knowledge if it is to his advantage - e.g., one may take possession of an ownerless object on behalf of a colleague without asking him. Hence, it is possible to assume that the agent can act on behalf of the woman without her knowledge (Yevamot 118b). "Acquire this get on behalf of my wife, so that she will not be required to fulfill the rite of yibbum," and gives him the get, but the husband dies before the get reaches [the woman], the status of the divorce is in doubt. [Although there are times when a woman would be willing to marry the yavam,] it is to the advantage of most women not to be required to fulfill the rite of yibbum. Therefore, even though the get did not reach the woman, since another person acquired it on her behalf, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

22. When [a man] tells witnesses: "Write a get for my wife after twelve months," or "Write a get for my wife and give it to her after twelve months," they should write [the get] and give it to her after the time he specified. If they write it within the time he specified,⁴⁴Because by writing it within this time, they deviated from the instructions with which they were charged (Gittin 76b). it is void, even if they do not give it to the woman until afterwards.

If they write it after the time he specified, but [the husband] dies before they give it to her, it is void. If it is not known whether he died before the get was given, or the get was given before he died, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

23. [If a husband] instructs [agents]: "Write a get for my wife and give it to her after the Sabbatical cycle," they must write it within the first year after the conclusion of the Sabbatical cycle.⁴⁵I.e., although the wording of the Hebrew original could possibly be interpreted otherwise, the commentaries agree that the Rambam's intent is that the get may be written immediately after the time specified and should not be written after a prolonged period has elapsed from that time. If he told them: "...after a year," they must write it during the first month of the coming year.

If he told them: "...after a month," they must write it during the first week of the coming month. If he told them: "...after the Sabbath," they must write it before the end of Tuesday. If he told them: "...before the Sabbath," they must write it between Wednesday and the end of Friday.

24. If they delayed and did not write and give the get at the time he specified - e.g., he told them "after a month," and they wrote the get and gave it to her after two weeks had passed in the second month, the get is unacceptable.⁴⁶The get is unacceptable because the husband's words also imply a restriction, that the get should be written directly afterwards and not after a prolonged period. Indeed, for this reason, Rabbenu Nissim [and the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 144:6)] rule that in such a situation, the status of the divorce is in doubt. In defense of the Rambam's ruling, the commentaries explain that even though the husband's intent may have been that the get be given immediately, since the wording he used could be interpreted to mean after a prolonged period, the get is acceptable according to Scriptural law.

25. If [the husband] entered into privacy with [his wife] after he told [agents] to write [a get], sign it and give it to her, they should not write it. One can make an [obvious] inference. If a get that he gave her is disqualified⁴⁷The Rambam is referring to his statements in Chapter 8, Halachah 2. There, however, he uses the expression, "the status of the get is in doubt." when he enters into privacy with her, lest they have engaged in marital relations, how much more so should a get that was not yet written [be left unwritten]. If [the agents] wrote the get and gave it to her after he entered into privacy with her, the get is void.⁴⁸The commentaries question the Rambam's decision, explaining that although there is a possibility that the couple engaged in marital relations and the husband consecrated her at that time (see Chapter 10, Halachah 18), it is also possible that this did not take place. Indeed, in Chapter 3, Halachah 5, with reference to a get given by a husband after he entered into privacy with his wife, the Rambam rules that after the fact, the get is acceptable.

[It is possible to differentiate between the two instances, because in that halachah, the husband himself gave the woman the get. This is a greater indication that he did not nullify it (Maggid Mishneh). Even after that explanation, however, the Rambam's ruling in this halachah raises questions.]

When referring to this law, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 149:7) accepts the ruling that at the outset, the witnesses should not have such a get written, but follows the ruling of the Ramban and the Rashba, who maintain that if they had the get written and gave it to the woman, the status of the divorce is in doubt.

26. [If a man] tells ten people: "Write a get for my wife," one of them should write it on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, write it," one should write it in the presence of all of them.

[If he tells them:] "Bring this get to my wife," one of them should bring it to her on behalf of all of them. [If he tells them:] "All of you, bring this get to my wife," one should bring it [to her] in the presence of all of them.⁴⁹This is the ruling according to Scriptural law. See, however, Halachah 28.

27. [If a man] tells ten people: "Write a get, sign it and give it to my wife," one of them should write it, two should sign it, and one should give it to her. It is acceptable even if one person writes it, he serves as one of the two witnesses who signs it, and he serves as the agent who gives it to her.⁵⁰There are many authorities who object to this ruling, maintaining that the scribe cannot sign as a witness to the get. In his Kessef Mishneh, Rav Yosef Karo states that even the Rambam agrees that at the outset, a scribe should not sign as a witness. After the fact, however, the Rambam maintains that his signature does not disqualify the get. In his Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 130:18), Rav Yosef Karo writes: "One should be careful not to have the scribe sign as a witness, because there are authorities who disqualify this."

If [the husband] tells them: "All of you sign it," they must all sign it. If the husband counted the people - whether he counted all of them or merely some of them⁵¹I.e., speaking to the people, he said: "One, two, three, four, write a get..." (Chelkat Mechokek 120:18). - and told them to sign it, it is considered as if he told all of them to sign it. The two who sign it at the outset act as witnesses,⁵²According to the Rambam, it appears that not only must the signatures of the acceptable witnesses be first chronologically, but they must also appear first on the get. Other authorities do not make this requirement and maintain that it is only chronological precedence that is significant (Beit Shmuel 120:14). while the others [should sign it to complete] the stipulation [the husband] made.

Accordingly, if the remaining witnesses were unacceptable, or one signed it on the day the get was written and the others on subsequent days⁵³The two witnesses whose signatures are required must sign the get on the day that it was written (Chapter 1, Halachah 25). - even several days after [the get was written],⁵⁴The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:9) states that they may sign the get to fulfill the condition even after it was given to the woman. The Ramah adds that this may be done even after she has remarried. the get is acceptable.⁵⁵Tosafot and subsequent Ashkenazic authorities differ and maintain that for the get to be valid, all the witnesses must be acceptable. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 120:10) mentions both views, but appears to favor that of the Rambam. The Ramah follows Tosafot's ruling.

If one of them died before signing it, the get is void.⁵⁶Because the instructions that the husband gave concerning the get were not fulfilled. If one of the first witnesses who signed it was unacceptable, the get is unacceptable, lest it be said that an unacceptable witness may sign other legal documents when many witnesses sign.⁵⁷See Hilchot Edut 5:6-7, which states that if persons who are unacceptable as witnesses signed a legal document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is disqualified, even if two acceptable witnesses signed it first. If, however, the persons who were unacceptable did not sign the document with the intent of serving as witnesses, the document is acceptable, even if the signature of the unacceptable person appears first. The only reason [our Sages] accepted [such signatures] with regard to a get signed by many witnesses is that the witnesses who observe the transfer are of fundamental importance.⁵⁸As stated in Chapter 1, Halachah 15. With regard to other legal documents, the witnesses who sign the contract are of paramount importance, and they must all therefore be acceptable. The witnesses who observe its transfer are less significant. But with regard to gittin, it is the witnesses who observe the transfer who are of primary importance. Therefore, if the initial two signatures to the get are acceptable, we are not concerned with those who sign subsequently (Maggid Mishneh; Kessef Mishneh, Hilchot Edut).

28. Our Sages established the [following] rules with regard to a person who tells many people to write, sign, or bring a get for his wife.⁵⁹These rules were instituted lest the the husband tell a group of people that they all should write, sign or bring a get, and they not appreciate that they were all charged with this responsibility. Lest some of them fail to discharge this responsibility and thus cause the get to be void, our Sages required that whenever many people are instructed to be involved in a get, they all must take full participatory roles. With regard to writing, he should tell them: "Any one of you may write a get for my wife." Similarly, with regard to bringing [the get], [he should say]: "Any one of you may bring...." With regard to signing, he should tell them: "Any pair of you should sign this get and give it to my wife."

29. Why did our Sages state that the witnesses to a get should sign only in each other's presence?⁶⁰See Chapter 1, Halachah 24, based on Gittin 10b. If the witnesses do not sign in each other's presence, the get is unacceptable (Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 130:13). [This is] a decree, [instituted] lest a person tell many others: "All of you sign [as witnesses]." If it were possible for witnesses to sign outside the presence of the other witnesses, two witnesses might sign the get, and the woman might take it and think that it does not require any more witnesses, [when in fact] the condition that [the husband made] was not fulfilled.

30. If [a man] tells three people, including a father and a son, "Two of you should write a get for my wife, sign it and give it to her," the get is acceptable whether the son signs with the other person or the father signs with the other person.⁶¹The father and the son may not both sign as witnesses, because witnesses may not be related to each other. [The son may serve in this capacity] because a person may appoint a son as an agent instead of his father.

31. When [a man] tells two [colleagues]: "Write [a get], sign it and give it to so and so to bring to my wife," or "...give it to [my] agent to bring to her," one of them should write it, and they should both sign it and give it to the agent. If they bring it to the woman themselves, the divorce is not effective, for they were not appointed as agents to effect the divorce.

What should they do [if in error they gave it to the woman]? They should take it back from her and give it to the agent, who should in turn give it back to the woman in their presence or in the presence of other [witnesses].

My teachers issued a ruling with regard to such a get that does not appear to be appropriate, because of a flaw that existed in the versions [of the Talmud] that they possessed.⁶²The Rambam is referring to Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's interpretation of Gittin 63b. Significantly, the standard published texts of the Talmud available to us follow Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's version. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:36) follows Rabbenu Yitzchak Alfasi's conception and rules that the status of the divorce is in doubt. (See the notes of the Beit Shmuel 141:99, which explain the Rambam's interpretation.)

32. [Our Sages ruled that] the status of a divorce is in doubt [in the following situation: A husband] tells a scribe: "Write me a get for my wife." [The scribe] wrote it and gave it to the husband, without this being observed by witnesses.⁶³And thus the get is not signed by witnesses. The husband took it, gave it to an agent,⁶⁴According to the Rambam (Chapter 6, Halachah 4), the appointment of such an agent need not be observed by witnesses. and told him: "Give this get to my wife in the presence of witnesses." The agent [carried out the instructions] and gave it to [the woman] in the presence of witnesses.

[The rationale is] that since he is only a single witness, an agent's statements would not be accepted [as grounds] to permit a woman who was [previously] forbidden to marry, except for the fact [that his statements are supported by] the written statements of the witnesses who signed the get. [For the witnesses' statements] are considered as if they were testimony given in court until [the husband] lodges a protest, as we have explained.⁶⁵See Chapter 7, Halachah 24. Note the question of the Beit Shmuel 141:17, who asks why the Rambam distinguishes between this instance and an agent charged with consecrating a woman, whose word is accepted, as stated in Hilchot Ishut 3:15. The Beit Shmuel explains that the fact that the get is not signed detracts from the agent's credibility. For although a get is acceptable when it has not been signed, this is not desirable. Hence, we are more suspicious of the possibility of forgery. If there are two witnesses who observed the husband giving the get to the agent and instructing him to use it for the divorce, the divorce is binding.⁶⁶As long as there are witnesses who observe the transfer of the get, the agent's actions are considered to be equivalent to those of the husband himself. Hence, just as a get given by the husband is acceptable after the fact if its transfer was observed by witnesses, even if the get was not signed, this same ruling applies when his agent gives the get.

33. [When a husband] tells an agent: "Give this get to my wife in this and this place," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to her in another place.⁶⁷For the wording the husband used implies that he is stipulating that the get must be given in that place. "...She is in this and this place," and the agent gave it to her in another place, [the get] is binding; he is merely pointing out the place.

Similarly, if he tells [the agent]: "Do not give it to her [anywhere] except in the house," and he gives it to her in the loft; "Do not give it to her except with your right hand," and he gives it to her with his left; "Give it to her on this and this day," and he gives it to her before that date; ⁶⁸From the contrast with the following clause, the Beit Shmuel 141:63 and others rule that, in this instance, the get is binding if it is given after that date. Note, however, the Mishneh LaMelech who differs and rules that the divorce is disqualified by the Sages. the divorce is not effective. "Do not give it to her except on this and this day," the divorce is not effective if he gives it to the woman before or afterwards, for he indicated that he wanted the get to be given on that date. Similar rulings apply in all analogous situations.

34. Similarly, when a woman tells her agent: "Receive my get for me in this and this place," and he receives it for her in another place, the divorce is not effective. [When she tells him:] "Bring me my get in this and this place," the get is acceptable if he brings it to her in another place.⁶⁹By accepting the get from the agent in the place she receives it, the woman shows that she is not particular about where she receives it (Maggid Mishneh in his gloss on Chapter 6, Halachah 4). The Rambam's ruling indicates a slight textual difference from the popular version of Gittin 6:3, the source for this halachah. There is, however, no difference in principle between them.

35. When [a man] tells an agent: "Bring this get to my wife," the agent may send the get with another person if he becomes ill or is otherwise prevented [from bringing it to her] by forces beyond his control.⁷⁰If, however, the agent is not prevented from discharging his agency, he should not charge another person with that responsibility. (See Chapter 7, Halachah 4 and notes.) [This applies] regardless of whether he told him: "Bring it [to her]," or "You bring it [to her]."

If, however, [the husband] told [the agent]: "Take the following article from her and give her this get," the agent should not send the get via another individual.⁷¹For it is likely that the principal would not desire that anyone other than the person he designated be given his article to guard. Rashi (Gittin 29a) offers a different interpretation. (See Beit Shmuel 141:65.) If [the agent] did send [the get] via another individual, and the woman came out to greet the agent and she gave him the article, and afterwards he gave her the get, the divorce is binding.⁷²Since the second agent did not deviate from the husband's instructions, the get is acceptable, despite the fact that a person other than the one appointed by the husband gave the get to the woman.

Rabbenu Asher rules that even if the second agent takes the article before giving the woman the get, the divorce is not effective. Although Rabbenu Asher's ruling is also mentioned, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:51) appears to follow the Rambam's decision.

36. If the agent - i.e., [either] the first [or the second] agent - gave the woman the get first and then she gave him the article, the divorce is not effective. [The rationale is] that [the agent] violated the husband's instructions with regard to a matter which, in general, would cause people to object.⁷³I.e., the husband was in effect saying, "Make sure you get the article before you give her the get." Since the agent did not fulfill these instructions, the divorce is not valid. See the Beit Shmuel 141:66, who quotes opinions that state that if the husband's wording does not indicate that he definitely wants the agent to secure possession of the article before giving the get, the divorce is binding. For the husband told him: "Take the article first and then give her the get," and he gave [the get] first and then took [the article].

37. [If the husband] told the agent: "Give her the get and take this and this article from her," [the agent] should not send the get via another person, for [the principal] would not desire that his article be entrusted to a person [other than the one he appointed].

If, however, the agent sent it with another person, the divorce is binding. [This applies] regardless of whether she gave the article before [receiving the get] or afterwards.⁷⁴For in this instance, there is no obvious advantage to the principal in having the agent give the get first.

As mentioned in the Maggid Mishneh, the Ramban differs and maintains that for the divorce to be binding the woman must give the agent the article first.

38. [If the husband] gives an agent a get and tells him: "No one other than you should give it to her," the divorce is not effective, if the agent gives [the get] to another person who gives it to the woman.

Similarly, [if the husband] told the agent: "Do not give it to her yourself. Give it to so and so, and he will give it to her," the divorce is not effective if the first agent gives it to the woman. For he was not appointed as an agent to effect the divorce.

39. [A husband] gave [an agent] a get and told him: "Bring this get to my wife."

The agent told him: "I do not know who she is."

The husband replied: "Give it to so and so. He knows who she is."

The [first] agent has not been appointed as an agent to effect the divorce.⁷⁵According to the Rambam, if the first agent gives the woman the get, the divorce is not effective. As mentioned in the notes on Halachah 31, other opinions differ and maintain that in this instance, the status of the divorce is in doubt. All he can do is give the get to the person whom the husband designated. That person is the agent appointed to effect the divorce. He must bring [the get to the woman] or send it via another agent if he becomes ill or is prevented from doing so by forces beyond his control.

40. When [a husband] gives an agent a get and tells him: "Do not give this get to my wife until after 30 days," [the agent] may send it to her via a second agent [whom he appoints] within the 30 days, if he becomes ill or is prevented from giving it to her by forces beyond his control.

[The rationale is that] even though at the time [he appoints the second agent] he is not charged with effecting the divorce, since he will function in that capacity after 30 days pass, he has the authority to appoint a second agent within the 30 days.⁷⁶Needless to say, the second agent should not give the woman the get until the original 30 days have passed.

Rav Meir HaLevi states that we suspect that the first agent will not convey these instructions clearly to the second agent. Therefore, the first agent should entrust the get to the court, which will appoint a second agent after the 30 days have passed. Although the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 141:37) mentions this view, it appears that the Rambam's view is favored.

41. When does the above apply? When the husband was not in the same city as his wife, or he was divorcing her after consecration,⁷⁷See Halachot 10 and 11.[but before the marriage bond has been consummated].

If, however, the marriage bond has been consummated, we suspect that perhaps the husband appeased her. Therefore, the agent should not appoint another agent within the 30 days unless the husband said: "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her." After 30 days pass, [the agent] should give her the get. However, we suspect [that perhaps it was nullified], as explained,⁷⁸See Halachah 9. unless [the husband] said, "I accept the word of my wife if she says that I did not appease her."