1. When a man says: "This is my son," or "I have sons," his word is accepted,¹The rationale for this ruling is the principle of migo. If the husband's statements were untrue, and his intent were merely to free his wife from the obligation of yibbum, he would not have to lie. Instead, he could give her a get (Bava Batra 134b).

See also the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:6) and commentaries, which mention other opinions regarding whether this ruling applies when the prevailing presumption is that the man is childless, when the prevailing presumption is that he has brothers, or when witnesses testify that he has brothers. and he frees his wife from [the obligation of] yibbum or chalitzah.

2. When²I.e., when the prevailing presumption is that he does not have a brother, and hence his wife would not be obligated to perform yibbum. a man says: "This is my brother," or "I have brothers," his word is not accepted, and his wife does not become forbidden [to others because] she is required to perform yibbum. [We assume that] his intent was to cause his wife to be forbidden [to other men] after his death.

3. When the prevailing presumption is that [a man] has brothers and he says at the time of his death,³Even though the statements are being made at the time of the person's death, when it is unlikely that he would lie, we still suspect that he is speaking falsely to spare his wife the difficulty of yibbum or chalitzah. "I do not have brothers," his word is not accepted.⁴One might assume that, as in Halachah 1, the husband's statements would have been accepted based on the principle of migo. For in this instance as well, the husband could free his wife from yibbum by giving her a get. Nevertheless, our Sages explain that the principle of migo does not have the power to counteract a prevailing presumption.

Still, even if the prevailing presumption is that a person has brothers, his word is accepted if he says that he has sons. The rationale is that, in this instance, his statements are not contradicting the prevailing presumption, but rather introducing a new factor (Beit Shmuel 157:9). Similarly, if he says that a person presumed to be his brother is not his brother, his word is not accepted.

If there was no prevailing presumption that he has brothers, but a rumor becomes circulated⁵There is a difference of opinion among the Rabbis whether or not this rumor has to be substantiated in a court. The Maggid Mishneh interprets the Rambam's opinion as being that even a rumor that is not substantiated should be taken into consideration. Needless to say, in the contemporary era, when communications have advanced and travel is easier, this question is far less significant than in previous ages. that there are witnesses who will testify that he has brothers, but these witnesses are overseas, the woman must take this factor into consideration and wait until the witnesses who were mentioned come, and are asked [concerning the matter]. [This ruling applies] even when the husband says, "I do not have a brother" at the time of his death.

4. [The following rules apply when] a man engaged in licentious relations with either a single woman or a married woman, she became pregnant, and he claims that he fathered the child. Even if [the mother] acknowledges his statements, and thus the son is considered his with regard to the laws of inheritance,⁶See Hilchot Nachalot 4:1. the matter is considered to be one of doubt with regard to the laws of yibbum. For just as the woman engaged in relations with him, she could have engaged in relations with another man.⁷If the woman is married, there is no question regarding the Rambam's ruling, for we presume that by and large, she engaged in relations with her husband. If she is single, the matter is more complex.

In this context, the commentaries draw attention to the Rambam's ruling in Hilchot Terumot 8:14, which states that when a priest had relations with a woman and she became pregnant, she is allowed to partake of terumah for the sake of her child. This indicates that we assume that she was impregnated by that priest.

As indicated by the Rambam's wording in Hilchot Terumot and in Hilchot Issurei Bi'ah 15:17-18, the matter depends on the woman's reputation. If she is known to be promiscuous, we consider the possibility that she was impregnated by another man. If, however, everyone presumes that she engaged in relations only with this man, he is considered to be the father of the child (Maggid Mishneh).

Nevertheless, the Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:9) quotes the Rambam's wording without making this distinction. See the Beit Shmuel 156:15. How is it possible to know with certainty that this is his son? There is no prevailing presumption to that effect.

The matter thus remains one of doubt, and the more stringent perspective should be taken. Hence, his wife [is obligated to] perform chalitzah,⁸Lest the child have been fathered by another man, and the deceased in fact be childless. and she [is forbidden] to perform yibbum.⁹Lest the child have been fathered by the deceased, in which case relations with his brother would be prohibited.

5. The testimony of one witness is accepted with regard to the death of a woman's husband, and she may perform yibbum on this basis. [Similarly, such testimony is acceptable if he states that] her yavam died,¹⁰Rabbenu Asher differs with the Rambam regarding this matter and maintains that the testimony of one witness is not acceptable with regard to the death of a yavam. Although the Ramah (Even HaEzer 158:3) quotes his opinion, many Ashkenazic authorities recommend leniency. (See Beit Shmuel 158:2.) or that her husband fathered a son,¹¹The Ra'avad and Rabbenu Asher differ with the Rambam with regard to this point, for unlike the death of a person, the birth of a child is not a matter that will surely become undeniable public knowledge. The Shulchan Aruch (Even HaEzer 156:8) quotes the Rambam's opinion, while the Ramah follows the other view. on which basis she would be granted permission to marry another person [without chalitzah].

Even the testimony of a servant or a woman, or statements of a gentile made in the midst of conversation are acceptable with regard to the death of a yavam, as they are acceptable with regard to a married woman whose husband has died, to enable her to be permitted to remarry, as mentioned in Hilchot Gerushin.¹²In Hilchot Gerushin, Chapters 12 and 13, the Rambam explains that the testimony of one witness is accepted in such instances, because:

When the matter can be verified definitively without the testimony of a witness, and the witness cannot justify [his statements] if they are not true - e.g., when one testifies that a person died - the Torah did not necessitate [that the requirements of formal testimony be met in these instances]. For it is unlikely that a witness will testify falsely.

For this reason, our Sages [extended] the leniency with regard to this matter and accepted the testimony of a single witness that is based on the testimony of a maidservant, [testimony] from a written document, and [testimony] that was not investigated by the ordinary process of interrogation. [These leniencies were accepted] so that the daughters of Israel will not be forced to remain unmarried.

6. Just as the statements of five [specific] women are not accepted with regard to testimony regarding the death of a woman's husband,¹³See Hilchot Gerushin 12:16, which states that the statements of a woman's mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, [her husband's] other wife, her yevamah (i.e., the wife of her husband's brother) and her husband's daughter are not accepted with regard to her husband's death, because the prevailing presumption is that they hate each other. so too, the statements of these five women are not accepted with regard to the death of her yavam.

The laws of the testimony governing the death of a yavam are the same as the testimony [governing the death of the woman's husband] with regard to disparities between the statements of the witnesses and all other matters.

7. [The following rule applies when] two widows, [each one married to one of two brothers,]¹⁴I.e., the women are married to two brothers. Thus each one is considered the yevamah of the other. come from an overseas country, this one says: "My husband died," and this one says: "My husband died." Each one is forbidden [to remarry] because of her obligation to the husband of the other one.¹⁵I.e., the testimony of each woman is accepted with regard to the death of her own husband. With regard to the death of her yavam, by contrast, the only testimony is that of her yevamah, and that testimony is not accepted. For the testimony of a yevamah is not acceptable with regard to the death of the woman's yavam, as stated [in the previous halachah].

8. If one of these women has a witness who can testify that her husband died, she is still forbidden to remarry - for she is not forbidden to remarry because of [an apprehension that] her own husband [is alive], but rather because of [the apprehension that] her yavam [is alive].¹⁶And with regard to the death of her yavam, there is no testimony that is acceptable to the court.

Even if the woman actually remarries, at which point it would be likely to assume that her husband is dead, her yevamah is still prohibited. Our Sages feared that a woman would risk ruin in both this world and the next, in order to cause her foe to be forbidden to her husband.

The woman who does not have a witness supporting her, by contrast, is permitted [to remarry], for a witness has testified that her yavam died, and her own testimony is accepted with regard to the death of her husband.¹⁷See Hilchot Gerushin 12:15.

9. If one of the above-mentioned women has children, and the other is childless,¹⁸And neither has witnesses to support her testimony. the one who is childless is forbidden [to remarry],¹⁹For she is dependent on the testimony of her yevamah, as above. and the one who has children is permitted.²⁰For her authorization to remarry does not depend on whether or not her yavam is alive.

If there is another living brother to perform yibbum, he should perform yibbum²¹Or chalitzah. with both of them.

10. If [in the latter instance], the yavam who married them died, they are forbidden to marry another man as they were originally.²²I.e., there were only three brothers. Since the death of the first two brothers was never verified adequately to allow these women to marry freely, the original prohibition applying to them remains in force. If, however, the yavam married them and then divorced them, they are free to marry other men.²³For her marriage and divorce releases each of the women from their obligation to their missing yavam.

11. A woman's testimony is accepted with regard to the death of her husband, and she may marry [another man] or perform yibbum [on this basis]. Nevertheless, the testimony of a yevamah is not accepted with regard to the death of her yavam, and it is not considered to be sufficient basis for her to marry another man. The rationale is that the prohibition [against marrying another man when under obligation to a yavam] involves merely a negative commandment.²⁴The punishment - lashes - is lesser, and the woman's children are not considered illegitimate. And therefore the woman may regard it casually.²⁵Having relations with another man while married, by contrast, is a prohibition punishable by execution by the court, her children are considered illegitimate, and it brings severe retribution in the world to come. Because the prohibition against marrying while under obligation to a yavam is less severe, our Sages feared that the woman might lie about the yavam's death and transgress this prohibition.

Similarly, the testimony of a yavam is not accepted with regard to the death of his brother, and it is not considered to be sufficient basis for him to marry his brother's wife. [We fear that] perhaps he desired her.

Similarly, a woman's testimony is not accepted with regard to the death of her sister, and it is not considered to be sufficient basis for her to be permitted to marry her sister's husband.²⁶It is forbidden for a husband to marry his wife's sister while his wife is alive. Our Sages feared that the second sister or the husband may desire to give false testimony, so that they can marry. [By the same token,] a man's testimony that his wife has died is not accepted as sufficient basis for him to marry her sister. In this instance, it is necessary that two witnesses testify that one sister has died before the other sister can enter her household. For the testimony of one witness was accepted only so that license to marry could be granted to a woman who would otherwise be forced to remain unmarried, as we have explained.²⁷I.e., generally, the testimony of two witnesses is required with regard to matters involving marriage and divorce. As mentioned in the concluding passage of Hilchot Gerushin (cited in the notes on Halachah 6), in order to allow a woman to remarry, leniency is granted and we rely on the testimony of one witness. In this instance, however, there is no difficulty in the man's or the woman's remarrying; the only difficulty is that they cannot marry each other. In such an instance, our Sages were not willing to extend leniency.

[There is a slight difficulty when comparing the Rambam's statements here to his statements at the conclusion of Hilchot Gittin. As explained by the Noda BiY'hudah (Even HaEzer, Volume I, Responsa 27 and 33), the Rambam's wording indicates that, according to Scriptural law, with regard to a point of fact that can be verified, it is not necessary for two witnesses to testify, and the statements of one witness are sufficient. The leniency granted by our Sages was to accept the testimony of women, relatives and others whose testimony would not ordinarily be accepted. Here, however, the Rambam is stating (as he does in Hilchot Edut 5:2) that the acceptance of the testimony of a single witness is a leniency of Rabbinic origin. (See the Responsa of the Rivash, Responsum 181.)]

12. Accordingly,²⁸I.e., based on the premise stated in the first clause of the previous halachah. when a woman, her husband and her yavam journey overseas, and she comes and says: "My husband died, and afterwards my yavam died," or "My yavam died, and then my husband died," her word is not accepted.²⁹For the prevailing presumption when she departed was that she would be obligated to perform yibbum if her husband dies.

If, however, she and her husband depart alone, and she returns and says: "A yavam was born for me overseas, but he died," her word is accepted, regardless of whether she says "My yavam died, and then my husband died," or "My husband died, and afterwards the yavam who was born for me died." [The rationale is] the source for the statements [on which basis the woman was] forbidden [states that she is] permitted.³⁰The prevailing presumption when she departed was that she would not be obligated to perform yibbum if her husband dies. It is only because of her own statements that we might suspect that she is required to do so. Therefore, her statements are sufficient to offset this suspicion.

13. [The following rules apply when] a woman journeys overseas together with her husband and her son: If she returns and says: "My husband died and then my son died," her word is accepted, for at the time she departed the prevailing presumption was that she was permitted to marry another man.

If she says: "My son died, and afterwards my husband died," her word is not accepted as the basis for yibbum.³¹We suspect that perhaps she is lying in order to marry her brother-in-law. Nevertheless, we grant a certain degree of credence to her words,³²I.e., were it not for her statement that her son died first, she would be permitted to marry without any restrictions. Because we give her statements some credence, we require her to perform chalitzah. and she should perform chalitzah, but not yibbum.

14. [The following rules apply when] a woman journeys overseas together with her husband alone: If she says, "I "bore a son overseas, he died, and then my husband died," her word is accepted and permitted her to perform yibbum. [The rationale is that] the prevailing presumption when she departed was that she was permitted to perform yibbum.

If she says: "My husband died, and then the son who was born to me died," her statements are not accepted as grounds to free her of the obligation for yibbum or chalitzah. Nevertheless, we grant a certain degree of credence to her words, and she should perform chalitzah, but not yibbum.³³I.e., were it not for her statement that her son died after her husband, she would be required to perform yibbum. We do not accept her word to the extent that we allow her to marry without restrictions. Nevertheless, we give her statements some credence and forbid the performance of yibbum, lest in fact there be no obligation to do so.

15. When does the above apply? When she was forbidden to the priesthood at the outset - e.g., she had been divorced or a chalalah³⁴A woman who is born from a relationship that is forbidden to a priest, but not to an Israelite. beforehand,³⁵In which case, the chalitzah does not make any difference, for the woman was forbidden to the priesthood regardless. - or she said: "We were [alone] in a cave when he died."³⁶In which case, there is no apprehension of witnesses coming.

If this is not the situation, she may not perform chalitzah, lest she perform chalitzah and then witnesses come and confirm her statements that her husband died first. Thus, it will be evident that this chalitzah was unnecessary, and she [is permitted to] marry a priest. An observer may see that she performs chalitzah and then marries a priest, and he would think that a priest is permitted to marry a woman who performed chalitzah, for he is unaware that witnesses came. Therefore, she should not perform chalitzah, nor should she perform yibbum.³⁷For according to her testimony, she is forbidden to do so. Instead, she should remain under the obligation to perform yibbum as she was when she departed, until witnesses come [and clarify the situation].³⁸Note the discussion of this ruling by the Beit Shmuel 156:17, and the opinion mentioned there that this ruling applies only when there were witnesses who testified that the woman's husband and son both died. Otherwise, the woman's word would be accepted based on the principle of migo - i.e., if she desired to lie, she could have said that her son was still alive.

16. Similar laws apply when a woman's husband and a second wife journeyed overseas, and two witnesses came and told [the first wife], "Your husband died." She should not perform chalitzah, nor should she perform yibbum until she knows whether or not her husband's second wife bore a child.³⁹This law applies even if the second wife was not pregnant when she left. Our Sages considered the possibility of the woman becoming pregnant as a reasonable probability.

Why should she not perform chalitzah nine months after the death of her husband, in which case she would be permitted to marry another man from any standpoint? If the other woman bore a child, that frees her of all obligations. And if the other woman did not bear a child, she [should be permitted, because] she performed chalitzah.

[Our Sages prohibited this] as a decree, lest after the woman performed chalitzah, it become known that her husband's other wife bore a viable child. This woman will then not be [bound by the prohibitions of] a woman who performed chalitzah, and she may marry a priest despite performing chalitzah. An observer - who did not know about the witnesses [who informed her of the birth of her husband's child] - might conclude that a priest is permitted to marry a woman who performed chalitzah, and he will testify that a Rabbinic court gave her license to marry a priest. Therefore, if she was forbidden to the priesthood at the outset, she may perform chalitzah nine [months after the death of her husband and] she may marry another man.

The wife who accompanied her husband when he died should wait 90 days, as other yevamot.⁴⁰See Chapter 1, Halachah 19. Thus, she may perform chalitzah or yibbum. She need not worry about [the possibility of] the wife in the country [giving birth], for that woman was not in the same country as her husband.⁴¹We do not consider the possibility that the woman was impregnated by her husband before he departed on the journey and did not realize this until he had already departed.

17. When a woman's husband dies, and her mother-in- law is living overseas, she need not suspect that her mother-in-law bore a child [before her husband's death], and that there is a yavam for her living in another country. Our Sages did not institute a decree of this nature.⁴²For even if we presume that the mother-in-law will become pregnant, it is more probable that she will miscarry or give birth to a girl (in which cases, the mitzvah of yibbum would not apply) than that she bear a son (Beit Shmuel 157:11). Instead, they allowed the prevailing presumption [regarding her status to continue], and she is permitted to remarry.

The same concept applies when a woman's husband dies, and her son is living overseas - she need not suspect that her son died [before her husband's death]. Instead, we allow the prevailing presumption [regarding her status to continue].

18. If, however, the mother-in-law departed [overseas] while she was pregnant, the daughter-in-law must bear that fact in mind. She may not marry another man until she knows the fate of her mother-in-law's pregnancy. Perhaps a yavam for her was born before her husband died.

19. [The following laws apply when] a woman's husband and son went overseas, and [witnesses] came and told her: "Your husband died and then your son died." If she married,⁴³For according to the testimony she was given, her husband was survived by a son, and the mitzvot of yibbum and chalitzah do not apply. and later discovered that they died in the opposite order,⁴⁴In which case her husband would have died without children, and she would be obligated to perform yibbum or chalitzah. she must leave her second husband.⁴⁵See Chapter 2, Halachah 18. None of the children she bore him is considered illegitimate, however.⁴⁶For it is only when a child is born from forbidden relations that are punishable by karet that this status is incurred (Yevamot 49a).

[More stringent rules apply if she was told: "Your son died and then your husband died," and on that basis she performed the rite of yibbum and then discovered that they died in the opposite order. She is obligated to leave her second husband. All the children she bore him - both those born before she received this notice and those born afterwards - are considered illegitimate.⁴⁷For her relations with her brother-in-law were prohibited by a transgression punishable by karet. The fact that she violated this prohibition unwittingly does not change the status of her children.